It is sometimes held that knowledge of one's own mental states is infallible, i.e. Non-inferential access is insufficient as a mark of the mental if one accepts that we have non-inferential knowledge of non-mental things, for example, in regular perception or in bodily experience. It has been argued that this access is non-inferential, infallible and private. On this view, a state of a subject constitutes a mental state if and only if the subject has privileged access to it. Ĭentral to epistemic approaches is the idea that the subject has privileged epistemic access to her mental states. This contrast is commonly based on the idea that certain features of mental phenomena are not present in the material universe as described by the natural sciences and may even be incompatible with it. Mental states are usually contrasted with physical or material aspects. This has prompted some philosophers to doubt that there is a unifying mark of the mental and instead see the term "mental" as referring to a cluster of loosely related ideas. The different approaches often result in a satisfactory characterization of only some of them. Mental states encompass a diverse group of aspects of an entity, like this entity's beliefs, desires, intentions or pain experiences. These approaches disagree not just on how mentality is to be defined but also on which states count as mental. These theories can roughly be divided into epistemic approaches, consciousness-based approaches, intentionality-based approaches and functionalism. Various competing theories have been proposed about what the essential features of all mental states are, sometimes referred to as the search for the "mark of the mental". 2.6 Classification according to Brentano.2.2 Sensation, propositional attitudes and intentionality.In psychology, the term is used not just to refer to the individual mental states listed above but also to a more global assessment of a person's mental health. Mental states play an important role in various fields, including philosophy of mind, epistemology and cognitive science. Eliminativists may reject the existence of mental properties, or at least of those corresponding to folk psychological categories such as thought and memory. Property dualists, on the other hand, claim that no such reductive explanation is possible. For (non-eliminative) physicalists, they are a kind of high-level property that can be understood in terms of fine-grained neural activity. An influential classification of mental states is due to Franz Brentano, who argues that there are only three basic kinds: presentations, judgments, and phenomena of love and hate. Conscious states are part of phenomenal experience while occurrent states are causally efficacious within the owner's mind, with or without consciousness. The characteristic of intentional states is that they refer to or are about objects or states of affairs. Propositional attitudes, like beliefs and desires, are relations a subject has to a proposition. Sensory states involve sense-impressions like visual perceptions or bodily pains. Important distinctions group mental phenomena together according to whether they are sensory, propositional, intentional, conscious or occurrent. Various overlapping classifications of mental states have been proposed. Some philosophers deny all the aforementioned approaches by holding that the term "mental" refers to a cluster of loosely related ideas without an underlying unifying feature shared by all. According to functionalist approaches, mental states are defined in terms of their role in the causal network independent of their intrinsic properties. Intentionality-based approaches, on the other hand, see the power of minds to refer to objects and represent the world as the mark of the mental. Consciousness-based approaches hold that all mental states are either conscious themselves or stand in the right relation to conscious states. According to epistemic approaches, the essential mark of mental states is that their subject has privileged epistemic access while others can only infer their existence from outward signs. There is controversy concerning the exact definition of the term. Mental states comprise a diverse class including perception, pain experience, belief, desire, intention, emotion, and memory. A mental state, or a mental property, is a state of mind of a person.
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